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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Smith appeals from his conviction for felony injury to a child, challenging the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress and the district court’s order concluding he breached his
plea  agreement  with  the  State.   Mr.  Smith  submits  this  Reply  Brief  to  clarify  what  happened
during the polygraph examination and to address the State’s legal arguments.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Smith included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant’s
Brief.  (Appellant’s Br., pp.1-4.)  He includes this statement here only to clarify what happened
during the polygraph examination, which is critical to the second issue he raises on appeal.  In its
Respondent’s Brief, the State asserts, “Smith later participated in a psychosexual evaluation and
polygraph, but when the polygraph indicated deception regarding past sexual contact with
children, Smith ‘terminated the process.’”  (Respondent’s Br., p.3 (citing R., p.387; Conf. Exs.,
pp.71-72).)  This is not accurate.  It is clear from the record that Mr. Smith completed the
polygraph examination, but refused to answer the examiner’s post-test questions regarding his
supposed deception.
In his report, the polygraph examiner stated that “[a] test was administered using a fully
computerized polygraph instrument . . . .”  (Conf. Exs., p.72.)  The examiner further stated that
during the post-test interview, he confronted Mr. Smith about his deceptive responses, and
Mr. Smith said he was no longer going to speak with him.  (Conf. Exs., pp.71-72.)  This is
consistent with what Dr. Lisota described—that Mr. Smith completed the polygraph
examination,  but  “did  not  pass.”   (Conf.  Exs.,  p.74.)   This  is  significant  because  the  plea
agreement obligated Mr. Smith to “complete a Psyho-sexual evaluation with a full disclosure
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polygraph (PSE).”  (R., p.373.)  As Mr. Smith argues below, he fulfilled his obligation under the
plea agreement when he completed a psychosexual evaluation with a full disclosure polygraph,
and did not breach his obligation when he refused to answer the polygraph examiner’s questions
regarding his supposed deception.
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ISSUES
 I.  Did the district court err in denying Mr. Smith’s motion to suppress?
 II.  Did the district court err in concluding Mr. Smith breached the plea agreement, thereby





The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Smith’s Motion To Suppress
Mr. Smith argued in his Appellant’s Brief that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because his so-called confession was not voluntary due to Officer Kelley’s
coercive and deceptive interview tactics.  (Appellant’s Br., pp.5-11.)  Mr. Smith properly set
forth the standard of review, and made the same argument he made in the district court, relying
principally on the same case, State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910 (Ct. App. 2012).  (Appellant’s Br.,
pp.5, 11; R., pp.349-52.)  In its brief, the State argues Mr. Smith “has not challenged the district
court’s ruling on appeal, but instead asserted contrary to precedent that the state bears some sort
of burden on appeal . . . .”  (Respondent’s Br., p.5.)  The State’s argument is lacking in merit.
As Mr. Smith stated in his Appellant’s Brief, when reviewing a motion to suppress, “This
Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  However,
this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light of
the facts found.”  (Appellant’s Br., p.5 (quoting State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009).)
The statements made by Officer Kelley that led to Mr. Smith’s so-called confession are
undisputed, as the entire interrogation was recorded.  This Court is thus called on to make a legal
determination as to whether or not Mr. Smith’s confession was voluntary. See, e.g., Valero, 153
Idaho at 911 (noting the factors surrounding the defendant’s incriminating statements were
undisputed because the polygraph examination was recorded, and proceeding to review the legal
question of whether the defendant’s statements were voluntary).
Because this is a legal question, Mr. Smith argues the legal issue.  When a defendant
alleges an interrogation to be coercive, the State does have the burden of showing by a
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preponderance of the evidence that the confession is voluntary. See State v. Brown, 160 Idaho
635, 637 (Ct. App. 2016).  As argued in his Appellant’s Brief, the State did not meet its burden
here because Officer Kelley did not provide Mr. Smith with adequate warnings pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), did not allow Mr. Smith to call his wife when he asked
to  do  so,  and  repeatedly  overstated  the  reliability  of  the  CVSA  test  and  the  importance  of
Mr. Smith accepting responsibility for his conduct, which the officer said was “undeniable”
based on the results of the CVSA test.  (See Appellant’s Br., pp.6-11.)
Like in Valero,  the  interrogating  officer  repeatedly  told  Mr.  Smith  that  the  CVSA  test
was evidence of his guilt. Compare Valero, 153 Idaho at 914 (detective conveyed to defendant
that “the polygraph was determinative of his guilt” despite defendant’s attempt to deny the
accusations against him) with Ex. 2, 4:47-55, 22:40-44, 32:39-56 (officer told Mr. Smith the
CVSA test “is extremely accurate” and “is proof positive to me” and “absolutely shows me this
happened” despite Mr. Smith’s repeated denials).  And like in Valero, the interrogating officer
misstated the law to Mr. Smith, telling him that taking responsibility “never hurts somebody”
and if Mr. Smith did not accept responsibility, “then they don’t have any other recourse then to
maybe impose the maximum.”  (Ex. 2, 32:00-10, 32:39-56.)  Officer Kelley refused to accept
Mr. Smith’s denials and ultimately fed him the “facts” he needed him to confess. Mr. Smith’s
confession was coerced and the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
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II.
The District Court Erred In Concluding Mr. Smith Breached The Plea Agreement, Thereby
Relieving The State Of Its Obligation To Recommend A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With
Three Years Fixed
The district court erred in concluding Mr. Smith breached the plea agreement when he
refused to answer the polygraph examiner’s questions regarding the supposedly deceptive
responses he provided during the polygraph examination.  Mr. Smith’s supposed deception
relieved the State of its obligation to recommend a rider, but it did not negate the plea agreement
as  a  whole.   On  appeal,  Mr.  Smith  contends  the  district  court  erred  in  its  ruling,  and  also
contends the State breached the plea agreement when it recommended a unified sentence of ten
years, with three years fixed.  (R., p.373.)  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a claim that
the State breached a plea agreement asserts fundamental error that can be raised for the first time
on appeal because it “goes to the foundation of a defendant’s rights.” State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho
71, 74 (2005).  The State breached its promise to recommend a unified sentence of ten years,
with three years fixed, see R., p.373, and Mr. Smith is constitutionally entitled to relief. See
Jafek, 141 Idaho at 74 (“A defendant is constitutionally entitled to relief when the State breaches
a promise made to him in return for a guilty plea.”) (citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Smith
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
Alternatively, Mr. Smith requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district court’s
order re: plea agreement breach and sentencing, and remand this case to the district court with
instructions that Mr. Smith be resentenced before a different judge, or be allowed to withdraw
his guilty plea.
DATED this 14th day of July, 2017.
/s/
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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